IN> Re: Selflessness Paradox

[dande002 at fish.co.uk]

Quoting Claribel <claribel at intermessage.com>:

> From: <dande002 at fish.co.uk>
>
> > So Malphas would say that David has managed to indoctrinate his angels
> > into thinking that self-sacrifice is in their interests, or has
> > conditioned them to feel happy when they are acting against their real
> > interests, or whatever.
>
> For angels, this is somewhat built-in. So, God, not [David], was the
> original programmer. Conditioning and self-conditioning seem to be more a
> human than a celestial matter, however.

This is to some extent true, but think of the initiation rites and group
practices among War, Stone and the Sword.  They're all analogues of human
practices that build up devotion to the cause and to the group.  Also if
celestials differ that much from humans they'd be uninteresting or unplayable
as PCs.

> The human mind has fewer built-ins
> and more user-programmable sectors. Some celestials have specific abilities
> in this regard (e.g. Balseraphs) but this is automatic for them, rather than
> a deliberate technique.

I'm sure minor empirical facts such as that archangels don't have balseraph
resonance don't bother Malphas when he's explaining how things are.  Besides
does anyone have any proof that archangels don't have the balseraph resonance?
They might say so, but what does that prove?
(Vapula and Fleurity together: 'Archangels do have the balseraph resonance.')
But as stated above, angels do feel more or less strong links to the group they
are part of.  Angels can swap from one archangel to another.

> > Otherwise, all it is saying is that you should do whatever you were going
> > to do anyway, which is meaningless.
>
> That depends on why you "want" it. Do you want it because you gain some
> personal pleasure or sense of value from it? Or do you want it only because
> you feel that you "should" or "must"? The two types of motivation are
> equally subjective, but different. The first would be described in
> behaviorist terms as positive reinforcement, the second as negative
> reinforcement. "Shoulding" or "musting" is generally not a pleasant
> experience; few people feel rewarded at the thought of an obligation
> (although, human psychology being as mixed and mushy as it is, the two are
> often combined.) Ethical egoism offers a critique of society's use of
> negative reinforcement to constrain individual behavior.

You're saying that society shouldn't use negative reinforcement, and should use
positive reinforcement?  :)
That looks more like a statement that genuinely virtuous behaviour is preferable
to encratic behaviour.  (Enkrasia is the state of mind in which you judge a
course of action to be ethical or rational and do it, despite really wanting to
take some other course of action.)  I doubt any serious ethicist would disagree
- although some like Kant have come close.  But I think even they were actually
concerned to make the point that enkrasia is preferable to akrasia (believing a
course of action to be ethical or rational, but taking a different course of
action).
But I can imagine an akratic ethical egotist: 'I know it's irrational to give
money to beggars, but I can't help myself if they ask me', and therefore an
enkratic ethical egotist: 'when a beggar asks me for money I feel him or her
tug at my heartstrings, but I know it's irrational so I steel myself and walk
past.'

> An ethical egoist could have valid reasons for engaging such volunteer work.
> She may enjoy the culture, have personal connections to it, enjoy the
> pleasure of creating a positive change in the world, etc.

As opposed to being indifferent to the pleasure of creating a positive change?
:)  What's wrong with: 'I feel intense pleasure when I create a positive
change, but I can take that pleasure or leave it.'  Or how about: 'I don't take
any pleasure in my work, but I enjoy it immensely'?

'Enjoy the pleasure of x' is a pleonasm: what it says that you enjoy
x.  (Incidentally, by whose standards are
we judging that a change in the world is positive?  Not pure ethical egotism.)
However, by using a pleonasm we create the impression that there is a subjective
experience (the pleasure) distinct from the objective results of the work, and
then we can ask whether it is the subjective pleasure or the objective results
that we enjoy.

In the case of physical pleasure, there is an experience distinct from our
subjective enjoyment of the experience, so it might make sense to say 'I
do/don't enjoy (physical) pleasure' - although even there that's more likely to
be a statement of motivation.  But normally there is no distinct experience: the
object of enjoyment is (what we believe is) the objective state of affairs.

David Anderson