IN> Selflessness Paradox

[Claribel]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: <dande002 at fish.co.uk>

> This requires a bit of a conceptual ambiguity.  If you accepted such a
> definition of selflessness, you'd probably find that you act for the sake 
> of
> such an internal reward: the internal reward would only come if you 
> weren't
> acting for the sake of it.

In which case, the person would never receive it. If you read the 
biographies of medieval saints, they tend to go through a lot of loops like 
that -- "I know that my merit is of no merit", etc. Followers of this 
philosophy can sometimes, if they're lucky, break out of this state through 
dissociation and enter a mystical experience in which they feel they're no 
longer in control. It's similar to the Zen use of paradox.

>.  You can make any course of action compatible with enlightened
> self-interest if you define 'self-interest' appropriately - e.g. you could
> define 'enlightened self-interest' as 'helping other people without regard 
> to
> yourself.  But it doesn't show anything interesting or substantial.

I'm using enlightened self-interest in the Grey Lilim sense of "trading 
value for value"; doing good for others, or doing something good in itself 
(e.g. creating something) in order to receive some benefit in return. For 
humans, at least, this benefit need not be external, tangible, or direct. 
(Whether Lilim care about internal intangibles would depend on the 
individual character. Demons, in general, tend to be rather 
concrete-minded.)
>
> I would think that enlightened self-interest, if it is to be an 
> interesting and
> distinct ethical position, would have to regard 'we will benefit 
> collectively'
> as confused (it ought to mean 'I will benefit and incidentally so will 
> other
> people' )and 'I will benefit by feeling a sense of self-satisfaction' as
> deluded (a sense of self-satisfaction is merely an illusory reward).

Well, I practice enlightened self-interest (ethical egoism) and I don't 
necessary regard all internal satisfaction as illusory. Humans can be 
conditioned to take satisfaction in almost anything. The question is not 
whether a given case of satisfaction is valid -- satisfaction is a feeling, 
so if you feel satisfied, you are -- but whether the satisfaction is /worth/ 
the other costs involved. A person can be conditioned to feel positive 
emotions at the thought of dying for his country in an aggressive war. His 
feelings are quite real, but are they worth the price?

So, there's the meta-ethic of how one should (re)condition oneself, manage 
one's own schedule of preferences. However, if you want to discuss this 
further, I suggest we take it to private email since this is starting to get 
away from what IN characters would say or do.

- Claribel